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(October 29, 2018)
We study the dynamics of the batch minority game,
with random external information, using generating func-
tional techniques a` la De Dominicis. The relevant control
parameter in this model is the ratio α = p/N of the number p
of possible values for the external information over the num-
ber N of trading agents. In the limit N → ∞ we calculate
the location αc of the phase transition (signaling the onset
of anomalous response), and solve the statics for α > αc ex-
actly. The temporal correlations in global market fluctuations
turn out not to decay to zero for infinitely widely separated
times. For α < αc the stationary state is shown to be non-
unique. For α→ 0 we analyse our equations in leading order
in α, and find asymptotic solutions with diverging volatility
σ = O(α−
1
2 ) (as regularly observed in simulations), but also
asymptotic solutions with vanishing volatility σ = O(α
1
2 ).
The former, however, are shown to emerge only if the agents’
initial strategy valuations are below a specific critical value.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le,87.23.Ge,05.70.Ln,64.60.Ht
I. INTRODUCTION
The minority game has been the subject of much (and
at times heated) debate in the physics literature recently.
It was originally introduced in [1], as a variation of the El
Farrol-Bar problem [2], to serve as a simple model for a
market in economics, and has since then attracted much
attention (see e.g. [3]). The players in the minority game
are trading agents who, at every stage of the game, have
to make a decision whether to buy or to sell, on the basis
of both publicly available information (i.e. past market
dynamics, weather forecasts, political developments or
stock prices) and their personal strategies. Those agents
who find themselves having made the minority decision
make a profit, while those agents which opted for the
majority choice loose money. After each round all agents
re-value their strategies. There are many variations on
the precise implementation of this game, yet most share
the same main features of the emerging market fluctu-
ations. The important control parameter in the model
is the ratio α = p/N of the number p of possible val-
ues for the external information over the number N of
trading agents. If this ratio α is very large, the agents
exhibit essentially random behaviour. This is reflected
in the fluctuations of the total bid, being the sum of all
buyers minus the sum of all sellers. If less external infor-
mation is available (or used) to base decisions upon, i.e.
for reduced α, the mismatch between buyers and sellers
is found to decrease, and the market behaves more ef-
ficiently. This behaviour is now understood quite well
on the basis of the replica calculations in [4–6] and the
crowd-anticrowd theory of [7]. The situation is much less
clear, however, when α becomes very small. One possi-
bility is that the market becomes extremely efficient, and
the number of buyers almost equals the number of sellers.
Another possibility is that the mismatch between buyers
and sellers diverges if the amount of shared (i.e. exter-
nal) information becomes small, and the market becomes
extremely inefficient (see e.g. [8,9]).
In this paper we solve the dynamics for the original
many agent model, using the exact generating functional
(or path integral) techniques introduced in [10]. After
defining the rules of the game we derive in the limit
N →∞ an equivalent description in terms of an effective
stochastic non-Markovian single agent process, for which
we calculate the first time steps. For sufficiently large
values of α, we can solve the statics exactly under the
assumption of absence of anomalous response. We cal-
culate the point αc where this assumption breaks down,
resulting in a phase transition; our value for αc is identi-
cal to that found in [4]. The present dynamical approach
allows us to study the behaviour of the market below αc.
In this region there exist persistent non-static solutions
which cannot be studied by the methods of [4]. Below
αc the market is non-ergodic and the initial conditions
of the agents determine the final stationary state of the
market. For α → 0 we calculate the market volatility in
leading order in α for the case where the agents are ini-
tialised with only weak strategy preferences, leading to
a diverging volatility with exactly the scaling exponent
σ = O(α− 12 ) predicted in [9] on the basis of heuristic ar-
guments. We find a critical value for the initial strategy
valuations above which this solution no longer exists, and
is being replaced by an alternative solution with a van-
ishing volatility of the form σ = O(α 12 ). Our dynamical
approach allows in addition for the calculation of the two-
time correlations in the global market fluctuations, by
definition inaccessible with equilibrium methods (replica
or otherwise), which are found to have a persistent com-
ponent. Numerical simulations confirm our theoretical
results convincingly.
1
II. MODEL DEFINITIONS
There are N agents playing the game. We will
only consider the case where N is very large, and ul-
timately take the limit N → ∞. The agents are la-
beled with Roman indices i, j, k, etc. At each iteration
round ℓ all agents are given the same (as yet unspec-
ified) piece of external information Iµ(ℓ), chosen ran-
domly from a total number p = αN of possible val-
ues, i.e. µ(ℓ) ∈ {1, . . . , αN}. In the original model [1]
the history of the actual market is used as the informa-
tion given to the agents. Each agent i has S strategies
Ria = (R
1
ia, . . . , R
αN
ia ) ∈ {−1, 1}αN at her disposal with
which to determine how to convert the external informa-
tion into a trading decision, with a ∈ {1, . . . , S}. Each
component Rµia is selected randomly and independently
from {−1, 1} before the start of the game, with uniform
probabilities, and remains fixed throughout the game.
The strategies thus introduce quenched disorder into the
model. Each strategy of every agent is given an initial
valuation or pay-off pia(0). The choice made for these
initial values will turn out to be crucial for the emerging
behaviour of the market. Given a choice µ(ℓ) made for
the external information presented at the start of round
ℓ, every agent i selects the strategy a˜i(ℓ) which for trader
i has the highest pay-off value at that point in time, i.e.
a˜i(ℓ) = arg max pia(ℓ), and subsequently makes a binary
bid bi(ℓ) = R
µ(ℓ)
ia˜i(t)
. The (re-scaled) total bid at stage ℓ is
defined as A(ℓ) = N−1/2
∑
i bi(ℓ). Next all agents update
the pay-off values of each strategy a on the basis of what
would have happened if they had played that particular
strategy:
pia(ℓ+1) = pia(ℓ)−Rµ(ℓ)ia A(ℓ)
The minus sign in this expression has the effect that
strategies that would have produced a minority decision
are appreciated.
This setup so far allows for an arbitrary number of
strategies S. The qualitative behaviour of the market
fluctuations, however, is found to be very much the same
for all non-extensive number of strategies larger than
one [11]. We therefore present results here only for the
S = 2 model, where the equations can be simplified
considerably upon introducing for each agent the instan-
taneous difference between the two strategy valuations,
qi(ℓ) = [pi1(ℓ)− pi2(ℓ)]/2, as well as the average strategy
ωi = (Ri1+Ri2)/2 and the difference between the strate-
gies ξi = (Ri1 −Ri2)/2. The actually selected strategy
in round ℓ can now be written explicitly as a function of
si(ℓ) = sgn[qi(ℓ)], viz. Ria˜i(ℓ) = ωi + si(ℓ)ξi, and the
evolution of the difference will now be given by:
qi(ℓ+1) = qi(ℓ)− ξµ(ℓ)i [Ωµ(ℓ)+N−
1
2
∑
j
ξ
µ(ℓ)
j sj(ℓ)], (1)
with Ω = N−1/2
∑
j ωj ∈ ℜαN . It has been observed in
numerical simulations, see e.g. [12], that the magnitude
of the market fluctuations remains almost unchanged if a
large number of bids are performed before a re-evaluation
of the strategies is carried out. This is the motivation
for us to study a modified (and simpler) version of the
dynamics of the game, where, rather than allowing the
strategy pay-off valuations to be changed at each round,
only the accumulated effect of a large number of market
decisions is used to change an agent’s strategy pay-off
valuations. This amounts to performing an average in the
above dynamic equations over the choices to be made for
the external information. If we also change the time-unit
accordingly from ℓ (which measured individual rounds of
the game) to a new unit t which is proportional to the
number of pay-off validation updates, we arrive at
qi(t+ 1) = qi(t)− hi −
∑
j
Jijsj(t) (2)
where Jij = ξi ·ξj/Nτ2 and hi = ξi ·Ω/
√
Nτ2, and with
τ2 = 〈(Ωµ)2〉 = 〈(ξµi )2〉 = 〈(ωµi )2〉; here τ2 = 12 ). The
above particular choice of time scaling has been made
only in view of it giving the simplest equations later. To
make a connection with the original game, one must in-
terpret the evolution of the qi(t) as described by (2) as the
accumulated effect of order N iterations in the original
model. Equation (2) defines the version of the minor-
ity game analysed in this paper. It has been argued [12]
that (2) can be converted into a continuous time limit
of equation (1), upon replacing [qi(t+1)− qi(t)]/
√
N by
dqi/dt. Strictly speaking, this is not true. A number
of agents change their preferred strategy at every iter-
ation of equation (2). The size of their q’s will be of
the order of (half) the step size. In the continuous time
limit, in contrast, this step size is lost; yet any discreti-
sation used to integrate the continuous time differential
equation obtained will effectively re-introduce an (arbi-
trary) scale for the q′s. This is not so relevant when the
only appearance of the qi is in sgn[qi], but it is of impor-
tance in the so-called Thermal Minority game [13], where
terms like tanh[βqi] appear. We therefore prefer the dif-
ference equation (2) over its continuous counterpart, and
regard (2) as the equivalent of what in the neural net-
works literature would be called the ‘batch’ version of
the conventional ‘on-line’ minority game. For a more
detailed discussion concerning the validity of a continu-
ous time differential equation for the TMG we refer to
[13,4,14]. Finally, the magnitude of the market fluctua-
tions, or volatility, is given by σ2 = 〈A2〉 − 〈A〉2. From
the starting point A(ℓ) = N−
1
2
∑
i[ω
µ(ℓ)
i + si(ℓ)ξ
µ(ℓ)
i ] and
on the time scales of the process (2), one easily derives
〈A〉 = 1
αN
√
N
∑
i
si
∑
µ
ξµi +O(
1√
N
), (3)
〈A2〉 = 1
2
+
1
αN
[
∑
i
hisi +
1
2
∑
ij
siJijsj ] +O( 1√
N
). (4)
Purely random trading corresponds to 〈A〉 = 0 and σ2 =
2
1. We will also define a more general object, the volatility
matrix Ξtt′ :
Ξtt′ = 〈[At − 〈At〉][At′ − 〈At′〉]〉 (5)
which measures the temporal correlations of the market
fluctuations. Note that σ2t = Ξtt. In the case where the
average bid 〈A〉 is zero (which will turn out to happen
in the present model), the volatility measures the effi-
ciency of the market. Zero volatility implies that supply
and demand are always at the same level, and that the
market is extremely efficient. A large volatility implies
large mismatches between supply and demand, and is the
signature of an inefficient market.
III. THE GENERATING FUNCTIONAL
There are two compelling reasons for studying the
dynamics of the minority game. Firstly, dynamical
techniques do not rely on the presence of a Lyapunov-
function, so that the MG can be studied for small α.
Secondly, it is clear from our simulations, see the fig-
ures below, that, at least on the relevant time-scales, the
stationary state of the minority game can depend quite
strongly on the initial conditions. One canonical tool to
deal with the dynamics of the present problem is generat-
ing functional analysis a` la De Dominicis [10], originally
developed in the disordered systems community (to study
spin glasses, in particular). This formalism allows one to
carry out the disorder average (which here is an average
over all strategies) and take the N → ∞ limit exactly.
The final result of the analysis is a set of closed equations,
which can be interpreted as describing the dynamics of
an effective ‘single agent’ [10,15]. Due to the disorder
in the process, this single agent will acquire an effective
‘memory’, i.e. she will evolve according to a non-trivial
non-Markovian stochastic process.
First we rewrite equation (2) as a Chapman-
Kolmogorov equation describing the temporal evolution
of an ensemble of markets:
pt+1(q) =
∫
dqW (q|q′)pt(q′),
where, in the absence of noise, the transition probability
density is simply
W (q|q′)=
∏
i
δ(qi − q′i + hi +
∑
j
Jijs
′
j)
=
∫
dqˆ
(2π)N
e
∑
i iq̂i(qi−q
′
i+hi+
∑
j Jijs
′
j)
with the short-hand s′j = sgn[q
′
j ]. The moment generat-
ing functional for a stochastic process of the present type
is defined as
Z[ψ] = 〈 ei
∑
t
∑
i
ψi(t)qi(t) 〉
=
∫ ∏
t
[dq(t) W (q(t+ 1)|q(t))] p0(q(0))
× ei
∑
t
∑
i ψi(t)qi(t)
By taking suitable derivatives of the generating func-
tional with respect to the conjugate variables ψ, one can
generate all moments of q at arbitrary times. Upon in-
troducing the two short-hands:
wµt =
1
τ
√
N
∑
i
q̂i(t)ξ
µ
i , x
µ
t =
1
τ
√
N
∑
i
si(t)ξ
µ
i ,
as well as Dq =
∏
it[dqi(t)/
√
2π], Dw =
∏
µt[dw
µ
t /
√
2π]
and Dx =
∏
µt[dx
µ
t /
√
2π] (with similar definitions for
Dqˆ, Dwˆ andDxˆ, respectively), the generating functional
takes the following form:
Z[ψ] =
∫
DwDwˆDxDxˆ ei
∑
tµ[ŵ
µ
t w
µ
t +x̂
µ
t x
µ
t +w
µ
t (Ω
µ/τ+xµt )]
×
∫
DqDqˆ p0(q(0)) e
−i
τ
√
N
∑
µi ξ
µ
i
∑
t[ŵ
µ
t q̂i(t)+x̂
µ
t si(t)]
× ei
∑
ti
[q̂i(t)(qi(t+1)−qi(t)−θi(t))+ψi(t)qi(t)] (6)
where we have introduced auxiliary driving forces θi(t) to
generate averages involving q̂i(t) (these can be removed
later).
IV. DISORDER AVERAGING
At this stage we can carry out the disorder averages,
to be denoted as · · ·, which involve the variables ξµi =
τ2(Rµi1−Rµi2) and Ωµ = N−
1
2 τ2
∑
j(R
µ
j1+R
µ
j2) only. For
times which do not scale with N one obtains:
e
i
τ
∑
tµ
wµt Ω
µ− i
τ
√
N
∑
µi
ξµ
i
∑
t
[ŵµt q̂i(t)+x̂
µ
t si(t)]
=
∏
iµ
e
iτ√
N
∑
t[w
µ
t (R1+R2)−(R1−R2)[ŵ
µ
t q̂i(t)+x̂
µ
t si(t)]]
= e−
1
2
∑
µtt′ [w
µ
t w
µ
t′+ŵ
µ
t Ltt′ ŵ
µ
t′+2x̂
µ
tKtt′ ŵ
µ
t′+x̂
µ
t Ct,t′ x̂
µ
t′ ]+O(N
0)
where we have introduced Ctt′ = N
−1
∑
i si(t)si(t
′),
Ktt′ = N
−1
∑
i si(t)q̂i(t
′), and Ltt′ = N
−1
∑
i q̂i(t)q̂i(t
′).
We isolate these functions via the insertion of appropri-
ate δ-functions (in integral representation), and define
the corresponding short-hands DC =
∏
tt′ [dCtt′/
√
2π],
DK =
∏
tt′ [dKtt′/
√
2π] and DL =
∏
tt′ [dLtt′/
√
2π]
(with similar definitions for DCˆ, DKˆ and DLˆ, respec-
tively). Upon assuming simple initial conditions of
the form p0(q) =
∏
i p0(qi), the i-dependent terms in
the disorder-averaged generating functional (6) are now
found to factorise fully over the N traders, and we arrive
at an expression of the following form:
3
Z[ψ] =
∫
[DCDCˆ][DKDKˆ][DLDLˆ] eN [Ψ+Φ+Ω]+O(N
0)
(7)
The sub-dominant O(N0) term in the exponent is in-
dependent of the generating fields {ψi(t)} and {θi(t)}.
There are three distinct leading contributions to the ex-
ponent in (7). The first is a ‘bookkeeping’ term, linking
the two-time order parameters to their conjugates:
Ψ = i Tr [ĈTC + K̂TK + L̂TL],
The second reflects the statistical properties of the play-
ers’ arsenal of strategies:
Φ = α log
[∫
DwDwˆDxDxˆ ei
∑
t
[ŵtwt+x̂txt+wtxt]
× e− 12
∑
tt′ [wtwt′+ŵtLtt′ ŵt′+2x̂tKtt′ ŵt′+x̂tCtt′ x̂t′ ]
]
(8)
The third term, which contains the generating fields, will
describe the (now stochastic) evolution of the strategy
valuations q(t) of a single effective agent:
Ω =
1
N
∑
i
log
[∫
DqDqˆ p0(q(0)) e
i
∑
t
q̂(t)[q(t+1)−q(t)−θi(t)]
× ei
∑
t ψi(t)q(t)−i
∑
tt′ [s(t)Cˆtt′ s(t
′)+s(t)Kˆtt′ q̂(t
′)+q̂(t)Lˆtt′ q̂(t
′)]
]
with s(t) = sgn[q(t)] and with Dq =
∏
t[dq(t)/
√
2π],
Dw =
∏
t[dwt/
√
2π], Dx =
∏
t[dxt/
√
2π] (similar def-
initions for Dqˆ, Dwˆ and Dxˆ). The form of Eq. (7) is
suitable for a saddle-point integration in the thermody-
namic limit N →∞. With a modest amount of foresight
we define Gtt′ = −iKtt′. Upon taking derivatives with
respect to the generating fields {θi(t), ψi(t)}, and using
the built-in normalisation Z[0] = 1, we find that at the
relevant saddle-point:
Ctt′ = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
〈si(t)si(t′)〉 (9)
Gtt′ = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
∂
∂θi(t′)
〈si(t)〉 (10)
Ltt′ = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
∂2
∂θi(t′)∂θi(t′)
Z[0] = 0 (11)
The first two are recognised to represent disorder-
averaged and site-averaged correlation- and response
functions. At this stage the generating fields are in prin-
ciple no longer needed. We will put ψi(t) = 0 and
θi(t) = θ(t), and find our expression for Ω simplifying
to
Ω = log
[∫
DqDqˆ p0(q(0)) e
i
∑
t
q̂(t)[q(t+1)−q(t)−θ(t)]
× e−i
∑
tt′ [s(t)Cˆtt′s(t
′)+s(t)Kˆtt′ q̂(t
′)+q̂(t)Lˆtt′ q̂(t
′)]
]
(12)
Extremisation of the extensive exponent Ψ+Φ+Ω of (7)
with respect to {C, Cˆ,K, Kˆ, L, Lˆ} gives the saddle-point
equations
Ctt′ = 〈s(t)s(t′)〉⋆ Gtt′ = ∂〈s(t)〉⋆
∂θ(t′)
(13)
Ĉtt′ =
i∂Φ
∂Ctt′
K̂tt′ =
i∂Φ
∂Ktt′
L̂tt′ =
i∂Φ
∂Ltt′
(14)
whereas Ltt′ = 0. The effective single-trader averages
〈. . .〉⋆, generated by taking derivatives of (12), are defined
as follows (note: s(t) = sgn[q(t)]):
〈f [{q}]〉⋆ =
∫
Dq M [{q}]f [{q}]∫
Dq M [{q}]
M [{q}] = p0(q(0))e−i
∑
tt′ s(t)Cˆtt′s(t
′)
×
∫
Dqˆ e−i
∑
tt′ q̂(t)Lˆtt′ q̂(t
′)
× ei
∑
t
q̂(t)[q(t+1)−q(t)−θ(t)−
∑
t′ Kˆ
T
tt′s(t
′)] (15)
Upon elimination of {Cˆ, Kˆ, Lˆ} via (14), we have now
obtained exact closed equations for the disorder-averaged
correlation- and response functions in the N →∞ limit:
namely (13), with the effective single trader measure (15).
V. SIMPLIFICATION OF THE SADDLE-POINT
EQUATIONS
The above procedure is quite insensitive to changing
model details; alternative choices made for the statistics
of traders’ strategies would simply lead to a different form
for the function Φ (8), whereas changing the update rules
for the strategy valuations of the traders (e.g. by making
these non-deterministic, as in [13,4]) would only affect
the details of the term Ω (12). We now work out our
equations for the present choice of model. Focusing first
on Φ, we perform the xt integrals, yielding
∏
t δ[x̂t+wt],
and after performing the remaining x̂ integrations we get
Φ = α log
∫
DwDwˆ ei
∑
t
ŵtwt
e−
1
2
∑
tt′ [wtwt′+ŵtLtt′ ŵt′−2wtKtt′ ŵt′+wtCtt′wt′ ]
The Gaussian integration over the {wt} gives
Φ = −1
2
α log detD + α log
∫ ∏
t
[
dwˆt√
2π
]
e−
1
2
∑
tt′ wˆtLtt′ wˆt′
× e− 12
∑
tt′ ŵt[(1−iK)
TD−1(1−iK)]
tt′ ŵt′
where the entries of the matrix D are given by Dtt′ =
1 + Ctt′ . We now take the derivative of Φ with respect
to Ltt′ , as dictated by (14), and subsequently put all
Ltt′ → 0. This gives
4
L̂ = −1
2
iα(1 − iK)−1D(1 − iKT )−1,
and limL→0Φ = −αTr log(1 − iK), so that
K̂T = −α(1 − iK)−1 Ĉ = 0
We now write our final result in terms of the response
function (10), via the identity K = iG, and find our
effective single trader measure M [{q}] of (15) reducing
to
p0(q(0))
∫
Dqˆ e−
1
2α
∑
tt′ q̂(t)[(1+G)
−1D(1+GT )−1]tt′ q̂(t
′)
× ei
∑
t q̂(t)[q(t+1)−q(t)−θ(t)+α
∑
t′ (1+G)
−1
tt′ s(t
′)] (16)
This describes a stochastic single-agent process of the
form
q(t+1) = q(t) + θ(t)− α
∑
t′≤t
(1 +G)−1tt′ sgn[q(t
′)] +
√
αη(t),
(17)
Causality ensures that Gtt′ = 0 for all t
′ ≥ t (so that
(1 + G)−1tt′ = 0 for t
′ > t), and η(t) is a Gaussian noise
with zero mean and with temporal correlations given by
〈η(t)η(t′)〉 = Σtt′ :
Σ = (1 +G)−1D(1 +GT )−1 (18)
The correlation- and response functions, defined by
(9,10), are the dynamic order parameters of the prob-
lem, and must be solved self-consistently from the closed
equations
Ctt′ = 〈sgn[q(t)q(t′)]〉⋆ Gtt′ = ∂〈sgn[q(t)]〉⋆
∂θ(t′)
(19)
Note that M [{q}] as given by (16) is normalised, i.e.∫
Dq M [{q}] = 1, so the associated averages reduce to
〈f [{q}]〉⋆ =
∫
Dq M [{q}]f [{q}]. The solution of (19) can
be calculated numerically with arbitrary precision, with-
out finite size effects, using a technique described in [16].
Finally, in appendix A we calculate the disorder av-
eraged re-scaled average bid 〈At〉 and volatility matrix
Ξtt′ = 〈AtAt′〉 − 〈At〉〈At′〉, for N → ∞, as defined pre-
viously in (3) and (5). Note that objects such as 〈At〉
must asymptotically become self-averaging, i.e. indepen-
dent of the microscopic realisation of the disorder; hence
〈At〉〈At′〉 → 〈At〉 〈At′ 〉 for N → ∞. We find the satis-
factory result that the average bid is zero, and that the
volatility matrix (and thus also the ordinary single-time
volatility σ2t = Ξtt) is proportional to the covariance ma-
trix (18) of the noise in the dynamics (17) of the effective
single agent:
lim
N→∞
〈A〉t = 0, lim
N→∞
Ξtt′ =
1
2
Σtt′ (20)
Thus the noise term η(t) in the single agent process (17)
represents the overall market fluctuations, and the covari-
ance matrix (18) informs us of both single-time volatility
and the temporal correlations of the market fluctuations.
VI. THE FIRST TIME STEPS
For the first few time steps it is possible to calculate the
order parameters (correlation- and response functions)
and the volatility explicitly, starting from the effective
single trader measure (16). Note that Dtt′ = 1+Ctt′ and
that Ctt = 1 for any t. Significant simplifications can be
made by using causality. For instance, we always have
(1 +G)−1 =
∑
n≥0(−1)nGn, with causality enforcing
[Gn]tt′ = 0 for t
′ > t− n (21)
At t = 0 this immediately allows us to conclude that
Σ00 = D00 = 2. We now obtain from (16) the joint
statistics at times t = 1:
p(q(1)|q(0)) = e
−[q(1)−q(0)−θ(0)+α sgn[q(0)]]2/4α
2
√
απ
(22)
Equation (22), in turn, allows us to calculate C10 =
〈sgn[q(0)q(1)]〉⋆ and G10 = ∂〈sgn[q(1)]〉⋆/∂θ(0):
C10 = −
∫
dq(0) p(q(0)) erf
[√
α
2
− |q(0)|+ θ(0)sgn[q(0)]
2
√
α
]
G10 =
1√
απ
∫
dq(0) p(q(0)) e−[α sgn[q(0)]−q(0)−θ(0)]
2/4α
We can now move to the next time step, again using (21),
where we need the noise covariances Σ11 and Σ10:
Σ10 =
∑
tt′
[1 −G+O(G2)]1tDtt′ [1 −GT +O(GT )2]t′0
= 1+ C10 − 2G10
Σ11 =
∑
tt′
[1 −G+O(G2)]1tDtt′ [1 −GT +O(GT )2]t′1
= 2− 2G10[1 + C01] + 2[G10]2
Although this procedure can in principle be repeated
for an arbitrary number of time steps, generating exact
expressions for the various order parameters iteratively,
the results become increasingly complicated when larger
times are involved.
It is interesting, however, to inspect further some spe-
cial limits. We first turn to the (trivial) case where α is
very small, p(q(0)) = δ[q(0) − q0] and q0 is finite. Pro-
vided |q0| ≫
√
α as α→ 0, we immediately deduce from
the above results that limα→0 C10 = 1, limα→0G10 = 0,
and limα→0Σ10 = limα→0 Σ11 = 2. Hence we find in
leading order in α that q(1) = q(0) and η(1) = η(0). One
easily repeats the argument for larger times, and finds
that, without perturbations, both the system variables
q(t) and the noise variables η(t) will remain frozen for
times t ≪ 1/√α, the only remaining uncertainty in the
noise being the realisation of η(0):
q(t) = q0 + t
√
α η(0) +O(αt) (α → 0)
5
If sgn[q0] 6= sgn[η(0)], the system will ‘de-freeze’ at the
first instance where t > |q0/η(0)
√
α|. Since η(0) is a
zero average Gaussian variable, one should therefore for
small α expect half of the population of traders (those
with non-profitable initial random strategy choices) to
commence strategy chances at time-scales t = O(α− 12 ),
whereas the other half will continue playing the game
with their (for now profitable) initial strategy choices at
least up to t = O(α−1).
It is also interesting to analyse the case where the game
is initialised in a tabula rasa manner (which appears to
have been common practice in literature), i.e. p(q(0)) =
δ[q−q0] with q0 = 0+, and where we have no perturbation
fields, i.e. θ(t) = 0. Now the above results reduce to
C10 = −erf[1
2
√
α] G10 = (απ)
− 12 e−
1
4α
Σ10 = 1− erf[1
2
√
α]− 2√
απ
e−
1
4α
Σ11 = 2− 2√
απ
e−
1
4α[1− erf[1
2
√
α]] +
2
απ
e−
1
2α
The negative value of the correlation function C10 implies
that for short times the traders will exhibit a tendency
to alternate their (two) strategies. Let us now inspect
the limiting behaviour of the above expressions for large
and small values of α. For large α one obtains
lim
α→∞
C10 = lim
α→∞
G10 = lim
α→∞
Σ10 = 0
In other words, the agents trade independently and ran-
domly; for larger times this will continue to be the case.
For small α, on the other hand, we find
C10 = −
√
α√
π
+O(α 32 ) G10 = 1√
απ
+O(√α)
Σ10 = 1− 2√
απ
+O(√α) Σ11 = 2
απ
− 2√
απ
+O(α0)
So η(1) = O(α− 12 ), whereas η(0) = O(α0). We also find
〈[η(1) + η(0)√
απ
]2〉 = Σ11 + 2√
απ
Σ10 +
1
απ
Σ00 = O(α0)
from which it follows that η(1) = −η(0)/√απ + O(α0),
and hence we can write the first steps of the effective
single agent equation (17) as
q(1) = q(0)− α sgn[q(0)] +√αη(0)
=
√
αη(0) +O(α)
q(2) = q(1)− α sgn[q(1)] + αG10sgn[q(0)] +
√
αη(1)
= −η(0)/√π +O(√α)
Thus also C20 = 〈sgn[q(0)q(2)]〉⋆ = O(
√
α) and C21 =
〈sgn[q(1)q(2)]〉⋆ = −1 + O(
√
α). We observe that for
small α the first two time steps are driven predominantly
by the noise component in (17). This noise component in-
creases in strength and starts oscillating in sign, resulting
in an effective agent which is increasingly likely to alter-
nate its strategies. Equivalently, this implies that in the
initial N -agent system an increasing fraction of the pop-
ulation of agents will start alternating their strategies.
Let us finally inspect the initial behaviour of equation
(17) for the intermediate regime where p(q(0)) = δ[q−q0]
with q0 = O(
√
α), to which (as we have seen) also for
q0 = O(α0) about half of the traders will automatically
be driven in due course. We now put q0 =
√
αq˜0 and find
in leading order:
C10 = erf[
1
2
|q˜0|] + . . . G10 = 1√
απ
e−
1
4 q˜
2
0 + . . .
Σ10 = − 2√
απ
e−
1
4 q˜
2
0 + . . . Σ11 =
2
απ
e−
1
2 q˜
2
0 + . . .
Thus we have 〈[η(1) + (απ)− 12 e−q˜20/4η(0)]2〉 = 0, so also
η(1) = −(απ)− 12 e−q˜20/4η(0), in leading order for α → 0.
This then, together with q(1) = O(√α) (which immedi-
ately follows from (22)), leads us to
q(2) = −π− 12 e− 14 q˜20η(0) +O(√α)
We thus find that also for q0 = O(
√
α) the initial condi-
tions are more or less washed out by the internal noise
generated by the process, within just two iteration steps.
VII. THE STATIONARY STATE FOR α > αC
For general α, not necessarily small, the arguments
used in the second part of the previous section do not
hold. In a stationary state, along with agents that will
change strategy (almost) every cycle, there will gener-
ally also be agents finding themselves consistently in the
minority group, which will consequently play the same
strategy over and over again. For the latter ‘frozen’ group
(a term introduced in [17]), the differences between the
valuations of the two available strategies (i.e. the values
of qi) will grow more or less linearly in time, whereas the
‘fickle’ agents will have values for qi very close to zero. In
order to separate the two groups efficiently we introduce
the re-scaled values q˜i(t) = qi(t)/t. Frozen agents will be
those for which limt→∞ q˜i(t) 6= 0. Similarly the effective
single agent process (17) is transformed via q˜(t) = q(t)/t,
where now the quantity φ = limǫ→0 limt→∞〈θ[|q˜(t)|−ǫ]〉⋆
will give the asymptotic fraction of ‘frozen’ agents in the
original N -agent system, for N → ∞. The dynamical
equation of the re-scaled effective agent can be written
as
q˜(t) =
1
t
q˜(1) +
√
α
t
∑
t′<t
η(t′)
−α
t
∑
t′<t
∑
t′′
(1 +G)−1t′t′′sgn[q˜(t
′′)] (23)
If the game has reached a stationary state, then Gtt′ =
G(t− t′), Ctt′ = C(t− t′) and Σtt′ = Σ(t− t′), by defini-
tion. We will in this section assume that the stationary
6
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FIG. 1. Asymptotic average c = limτ→∞ τ
−1
∑
t≤τ
C(τ )
of the stationary covariance. The markers are obtained
from individual simulation runs performed with a system of
N = 4000 agents and various homogeneous initial valuations
(where qi(0) = q(0)), and in excess of 1000 iteration steps.
The solid curve to the right of the critical point is the theo-
retical prediction, given by the solution of (26). The dotted
curve to the left is its continuation into the α < αc regime
(where it should no longer be correct).
state is one without anomalous response, i.e. temporary
perturbations will not influence the stationary state and
decay sufficiently fast, such that limτ→∞
∑
t≤τ G(t) = k
exists. This condition will be met if there is just one er-
godic component; it is the dynamical equivalent of replica
symmetry being stable (see e.g. [18]) in a detailed balance
model. We now define q˜ = limt→∞ q˜(t) (assuming this
limit exists) and take the limit t → ∞ in Eqn. (23).
Under the assumption of absent anomalous response, we
can use the two lemmas in appendix B to simplify the
result to
q˜ = − α
1 + k
s+
√
αη (24)
with the averages s = limτ→∞ τ
−1
∑
t≤τ sgn[q˜t] and η =
limτ→∞ τ
−1
∑
t≤τ η(t). The variance of the zero-average
Gaussian random variable η follows from (18):
〈η2〉 = lim
τ,τ ′→∞
1
ττ ′
∑
t≤τ
∑
t′≤τ ′
[(1 +G)−1D(1 +GT )−1]tt′
= (1 + k)−2[1 + lim
τ,τ ′→∞
1
ττ ′
∑
t≤τ
∑
t′≤τ ′
Ctt′ ]
= (1 + k)−2[1 + 〈s2〉] (25)
Note that 〈s2〉 = limτ→∞ τ−1
∑
t≤τ C(t) = c.
The effective agent is frozen if q˜ 6= 0, in which case
s = sgn[q˜]. This solves equation (24) if and only if |η| >√
α/(1 + k). If |η| < √α/(1 + k), on the other hand, the
agent is not frozen; now q˜ = 0 and s = (1 + k)η/
√
α.
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FIG. 2. Fraction φ = 1 − erf[
√
α/2(1 + c)] of frozen
agents in the stationary state. The markers are obtained
from individual simulation runs performed with a system of
N = 4000 agents and various homogeneous initial conditions,
where qi(0) = q(0), and in excess of 1000 iteration steps. The
solid line to the right of the critical point is the theoretical
prediction, obtained from the solution of (26). The dotted
curve to the left is its continuation into the α < αc regime
(where it should no longer be correct).
We can now calculate c = 〈s2〉 self-consistently, upon
distinguishing between the two possibilities:
c = 〈θ
[
|η| −
√
α
1 + k
]
〉+ 〈θ
[ √
α
1 + k
− |η|
]
(1 + k)2η2
α
〉
Working out the Gaussian integrals describing the statics
of η, with variance (25), then gives
c = 1− (1− 1 + c
α
) erf
[√
α
2(1 + c)
]
− 2
√
1 + c
2πα
e−
α
2(1+c) .
(26)
From this equation the value of c can be solved numer-
ically. For large α the solution behaves as c ∼ α−1. In
figures 1 and 2 we show the solution of (26) and the frac-
tion φ of frozen agents, given according to the theory
by φ = 〈θ[|η| − √α/(1 + k)]〉 = 1 − erf[
√
α/2(1 + c)], as
functions of α, together with the values for c and φ as
obtained by carrying out numerical simulations of the mi-
nority game. One observes excellent agreement between
theory and experiment above a critical value αc, which
we will calculate below.
From the time-averaged asymptotic correlation c we
next move on to calculate the integrated response k =
limτ→∞
∑
t≤τ G(t). Since the occurrence of the Gaus-
sian noise term η(t) in Eqn. (17) is (apart from a factor√
α) similar to that of an external field, we can write the
response function as Gtt′ = α
− 12 〈∂ sgn[q(t)]/∂η(t′)〉⋆. In-
tegration by parts in this expression generates
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〈∂ sgn[q(t)]/∂η(t′)〉⋆ =
∑
t′′
Σ−1t′t′′〈sgn[q(t)]η(t′′)〉⋆
and hence
√
α
∑
t′′
〈η(t)η(t′′)〉GTt′′t′ = 〈sgn[q(t)]η(t′)〉⋆ (27)
Averaging over the two times t and t′ now gives in
a stationary state, upon using again the assumption
of absent anomalous response (and the familiar nota-
tional conventions s = limτ→∞ τ
−1
∑
t≤τ sgn[q(t)] and
η = limτ→∞ τ
−1
∑
t≤τ sgn[q(t)]):
〈sη〉 = √α lim
τ→∞
1
τ
∑
t′≤τ
∑
t′′
〈ηη(t′′)〉GTt′′t′
= k
√
α〈η2〉 (28)
The variance 〈η2〉 is given in (25). We calculate the re-
maining object 〈sη〉 similarly to our calculation of c, by
distinguishing between frozen and non-frozen agents and
by using the two identities s = sgn[η] (for frozen agents)
and s = η(1 + k)/
√
α (for the non-frozen ones), both of
which follow immediately from (24). This results in
〈sη〉 = 〈θ
[
|η| −
√
α
1 + k
]
|η|〉+ 〈θ
[ √
α
1 + k
− |η|
]
η2(1 + k)√
α
〉
=
1 + c
(1 + k)
√
α
erf
[√
α
2(1 + c)
]
Insertion into (28), together with (25), then gives the
desired expression for the integrated response:
1
k
=
α
erf[
√
α
2(1+c) ]
− 1 (29)
with the value of c to be determined by solving Eqn. (26).
Equivalently, using φ = 1− erf[
√
α/2(1 + c)] we get
k =
1− φ
α− 1 + φ (30)
The integrated response k is positive and finite, and
hence our solution (based on this property) is exact, for
α > αc. Here αc is the point at which k diverges, which is
found to happen when the fraction of fickle agents equals
α. According to (26,29) we can write αc as αc = erf[x],
where x is the solution of the transcendental equation
erf[x] = 2− 1
x
√
π
e−x
2
(31)
The resulting value αc ≈ 0.33740 is identical to that
found in [4] (for a stochastic version of the game) using
replica calculations. Below αc there might well be mul-
tiple ergodic components, i.e. more than one stationary
solution of our fundamental order parameter equations
(19).
VIII. STATIONARY VOLATILITY FOR α > αC
In contrast to the persistent order parameter c and
its relative k, the volatility matrix (5), to be calculated
within our theory from expressions (18,20) and in a sta-
tionary state of the Toeplitz form Ξtt′ = Ξ(t − t′), gen-
erally involves both long-term and short-term fluctua-
tions. This becomes apparent when we work out Ξ(t)
using (18) and the results of appendix B. We separate
in the functions C and G the persistent from the non-
persistent terms, i.e. C(t) = c + C˜(t) and G(t) = G˜(t)
(there is no persistent response for α > αc), and find
2Ξ(t) =
1 + c
(1 + k)2
+
lim
τ→∞
1
τ
∑
u≤τ
∑
t′t′′
(1 + G˜)−1u+t t′C˜t′t′′(1 + G˜
T )−1t′′u (32)
Clearly, the asymptotic (stationary) value of the volatil-
ity σ2 = Ξ(0) cannot be expressed in terms of persistent
order parameters only. It requires solving our coupled
saddle-point equations (19) for Ctt′ and Gtt′ for large
times but finite temporal separations t − t′. The persis-
tent market correlations, however, are found to be ex-
pressible in terms of persistent order parameters:
Ξ(∞) = 1 + c
2(1 + k)2
(33)
In order to find the volatility we separate the correlations
at stationarity in a ‘frozen’ and a ‘fickle’ contribution:
C(t− t′) = φ〈sgn[q˜(t)q˜(t′)]〉fr + (1− φ)〈sgn[q˜(t)q˜(t′)]〉fi
= φ+ (1− φ)〈sgn[q˜(t)]sgn[q˜(t′)]〉fi
and hence
C˜(t− t′) = φ− c+ (1 − φ)〈sgn[q˜(t)]sgn[q˜(t′)]〉fi
Insertion into (32) and putting t = 0 then gives
2σ2 =
1 + φ
(1 + k)2
+ (1− φ) lim
τ→∞
1
τ
∑
t≤τ
∑
t′t′′
× (1 + G˜)−1tt′ 〈sgn[q˜(t′)]sgn[q˜(t′′)]〉fi(1 + G˜T )−1t′′t
=
1 + φ
(1 + k)2
+ (1− φ)
× lim
τ→∞
1
τ
∑
t≤τ
〈
∑
t′≤t
(1 + G˜)−1tt′ sgn[q˜(t
′)]

2
〉fi (34)
We note that the sum
∑
t′<t(1 + G˜)
−1
tt′ sgn[q˜(t
′)], is the
retarded self-interaction term in equation (17). Such a
term is a familiar ingredient of disordered systems with
‘glassy’ dynamics (see e.g. [19]), and generally acts as the
mechanism which drives the system to a ‘frozen’ state.
Hence, self-consistency of the distinction between frozen
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FIG. 3. The volatility σ as a function of the relative num-
ber α = p/N of possible values for the external information.
The markers are obtained from individual simulation runs
performed with a system of N = 4000 agents and various
homogeneous initial conditions, where qi(0) = q(0), and in
excess of 1000 iteration steps. The solid curve for α > αc is
the approximate expression (35). Below αc the approximate
asymptotic solutions of Eqns. (61) (solid) and (62) (dashed)
are drawn.
and fickle traders dictates that the retarded self-
interaction term can be large for frozen traders, but must
be small (if not absent) for fickle ones. Our approxima-
tion now consists in consequently disregarding the re-
tarded self-interaction for the fickle traders:
|η| <
√
α
1 + k
:
∑
t′<t
(1 + G˜)−1tt′ sgn[q˜(t
′)] ≈ 0
Thus we retain for fickle traders only the instantaneous
t′ = t term in
∑
t′≤t(1 +G˜)
−1
tt′ sgn[q˜(t
′)], and find the (ex-
act) expression (34) being replaced by the approximation
σ2 =
1 + φ
2(1 + k)2
+
1
2
(1− φ) (35)
This turns out to be a surprisingly accurate approxima-
tion of the volatility for α > αc, as can be observed in
Fig. 3.
Only in the limit α → ∞ can we expect to be able to
go beyond (33) and (35), and work out expressions (32)
and (34) exactly. This requires calculating the response
function G˜(τ) for small τ , which we will set out to do
next. Since we assume absent anomalous response we
may choose trivial initial conditions. We also choose the
perturbation fields θ(t) to be non-zero only for a given
time t− τ , where τ > 0. From (17) we now derive
sgn[q(t)] = sgn
θ(t− τ)
t
√
α
+
1
t
∑
t′≤t
η(t′)
−
√
α
t
∑
t′t′′≤t
(1 +G)−1t′t′′sgn[q(t
′′)]
 (36)
Hence, for vanishingly small perturbations θ(t − τ), and
upon taking the t→∞ limit:
G˜(τ) = − 2
√
α
1 + k
lim
t→∞
1
t
∑
t′≤t
〈δ
[
η − s
√
α
1 + k
] [
∂sgn[q(t′)]
∂θ(t′ − τ)
]
〉
+2〈δ
[
η − s
√
α
1 + k
] lim
t→∞
1
t
∑
t′≤t
∂η(t′)
∂θ(t− τ)
〉
We observe that η = s
√
α/(1 + k) is precisely the
condition for a trader to be fickle, in the language
of the effective single agent. Secondly, from causal-
ity it follows that limt→∞ t
−1
∑
t′≤t ∂η(t
′)/∂θ(t − τ) =
limt→∞ t
−1
∑t
t′=t−τ+1 ∂η(t
′)/∂θ(t − τ) = 0. Hence our
result can in a stationary state be written as
G˜(τ) = −2
√
α(1 − φ)
1 + k
lim
t→∞
〈∂sgn[q(t)]
∂θ(t− τ) 〉fi (37)
For α → ∞ our stationary order parameter equations
give (1 − φ)/(1 + k) → 1. Furthermore, for α → ∞ all
traders will become fickle, so 〈∂sgn[q(t)]/∂θ(t − τ)〉fi →
G˜(τ). This leaves for α → ∞ only the trivial solution
for equation (37): limα→∞ G˜(τ) = 0 for all τ . Insertion
into our exact expression (32) for the stationary volatility
matrix gives
lim
α→∞
Ξ(t) =
1
2
+
1
2
lim
α→∞
C˜(t)
and hence
lim
α→∞
lim
t→∞
σ = 1 (38)
This is the random trading limit.
IX. THE STATIONARY STATE FOR α < αC
When the amount of external information available for
agents to base their actions upon (i.e. the value of α),
becomes small, the behaviour of the market is found to
become strongly dependent on initial conditions. Numer-
ical simulations show that below αc the sequence
∑
t′ Gtt′
is unbounded, and that within the limits of experimental
accuracy:
lim
t→∞
∑
t′
(1 +G)−1tt′ = 0 (39)
Ct+τ,t = c+ d(−1)τ for τ 6= 0 (40)
(with Ctt = 1, by definition). Figure 4 shows the asymp-
totic values of d as measured during numerical simula-
tions, for different values of α and q(0). One clearly ob-
serves the dependence on initial conditions.
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FIG. 4. The oscillatory component d of the covariance
(see equation (40)). The markers represent the results of in-
dividual simulations, performed with N = 4000 agents and
various homogeneous initial conditions, where qi(0) = q(0),
and after in excess of 1000 iteration steps.
We will now use (39,40) as ansa¨tze, i.e. we will con-
struct special self-consistent stationary state solutions of
the fundamental order parameter equations (19) which
obey (39,40), as well as the stationary state conditions
Ctt′ = C(t − t′) and Gtt′ = G(t − t′). First we analyse
the statistical properties of the Gaussian noise η(t) in the
single agent equation (17). From (39,40) it follows that
the noise covariance matrix (18) obeys
lim
t→∞
〈η(t+ τ)η(t)〉 = (−1)τdγ2 +
(1− c− d)
∑
t
(1 +G)−1(t+ τ)(1 +G)−1(t) (41)
in which
γ =
∑
t
(1 +G)−1(t)(−1)t (42)
From (41) one can derive, in turn, that the noise variables
must asymptotically take the form:
t→∞ : η(t) = (−1)tγz
√
d+ ξ(t)
√
1− c− d (43)
where z and {ξ(t)} are zero-average Gaussian variables,
with 〈z2〉 = 1, 〈zξ(t)〉 = 0, and
lim
t→∞
〈ξ(t+ τ)ξ(t)〉 =
∑
t
(1 +G)−1(t+ τ)(1 +G)−1(t)
Due to (39) we know that limτ→∞ limt→∞〈ξ(t+τ)ξ(t)〉 =
0, i.e. in the stationary state the ξ(t) decorrelate for large
temporal separations. For sufficiently large t, and with-
out external perturbations, equation (17) now acquires
the form
q(t+1) = q(t) + γz
√
αd(−1)t + ξ(t)
√
α(1− c− d)
−α
∑
t′≤t
(1 +G)−1tt′ sgn[q(t
′)] (44)
Frozen agents are those for which sgn[q(t)] is independent
of time; due to (39) these will not experience the last term
in (44). However, due to the properties of the noise in the
α < αc regime (and in contrast to the situation with α >
αc), even frozen agents will now have limt→∞ q(t)/t = 0.
Insertion into Eqn. (44) shows that frozen solutions of
the following form exist:
q(t) = q − 1
2
γz
√
αd(−1)t (45)
provided sgn[q(t)] = sgn[q] for all t, so q and d must obey
d = 1− c, |q| > |1
2
γz
√
αd| (46)
Oscillating agents, on the other hand, are those for which
sgn[q(t)] = σˆ(−1)t, with σˆ = ±1. Insertion into Eqn.
(44) shows that oscillating solutions of the following form
exist:
q(t) = q +
1
2
γσˆ[α− zσˆ
√
αd](−1)t (47)
provided sgn[q(t + 1)] = −sgn[q(t)] for all t, so q and d
must obey
d = 1−c, γ[α−zσˆ
√
αd] > 0, |q| < 1
2
γ[α−zσˆ
√
αd]
(48)
Note that, if rigorously frozen and/or rigorously oscil-
lating agents were to be asymptotic solutions of (44),
then the correlations would have come out as C(τ) =
φ+(1−φ)(−1)τ (with φ, as before, denoting the fraction
of frozen agents), and we would have found c + d = 1.
Figures 1 and 4, however, show that this simple relation
holds only near α = 0. Away from α = 0 there will there-
fore be solutions describing fickle agents which change
strategy at intervals intermediate between one (oscillat-
ing) and infinity (frozen). This can be understood on the
basis of (44), where due to the noise term ξ(t) (with a
finite temporal correlation length) there will for c+d < 1
always be a non-zero probability of nearly frozen agents
changing strategy occasionally, and of nearly oscillating
agents not changing strategy occasionally.
X. THE LIMIT α→ 0
Let us finally investigate the situation near α = 0 more
closely, where we may use the experimental observation
that c + d ≈ 1, which implies that all agents will be
either frozen or oscillating. We put c = φ (the fraction of
frozen agents) and d = 1 − φ, and choose homogeneous
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initial conditions with q(0) > 0. We now find η(t) =
(−1)tγz
√
(1− φ) and our two solution types given by:
frozen : q(t) = q − 1
2
γz
√
α(1− φ)(−1)t
oscillating : q(t) = q +
1
2
γσˆ[α− zσˆ
√
α(1− φ)](−1)t
provided the following respective conditions for existence
are met:
frozen : |q| > |1
2
γz
√
α(1 − φ)| (49)
oscillating : |q| < 1
2
γ[α− zσˆ
√
α(1 − φ)]
γ
√
α > γzσˆ
√
1− φ (50)
Near α = 0 we also know, due to c+ d = 1, that
t→∞ : 〈η(t+ τ)η(t)〉 = (−1)τ (1− φ)γ2 (51)
t→∞ : η(t) = (−1)tγz
√
1− φ (52)
and that limt→∞ σ
2 = 12 (1 − φ)γ2. In order to elim-
inate the remaining parameters γ and φ we note that
time translation invariance guarantees the validity of the
relation
∑
t(G
n)(t)(−1)t = [∑tG(t)(−1)t]n, and hence
γ = (1 + Γ)−1 Γ =
∑
t
G(t)(−1)t (53)
The quantity Γ can, in turn, be expressed in terms of γ
upon inserting (51,52) into (27). We obtain
√
α(1− φ)γ(1 − γ)(−1)τ = lim
t→∞
〈sgn[q(t+ τ)]η(t)〉⋆
Working out the average in the right-hand side, by sepa-
rating frozen from fickle solutions, gives for large t:
〈sgn[q(t+τ)]η(t)〉⋆ = φ 〈sgn[q(t+τ)]η(t)〉fr
+(1−φ) 〈sgn[q(t+τ)]η(t)〉fi
= γ
√
(1−φ)(−1)τ {φ(−1)t〈sgn[q]z〉fr
+ (1−φ) 〈σˆz〉fi}
Since in a stationary state the correlation function
〈sgn[q(t)]η(t′)〉⋆ can only depend on t− t′, we must con-
clude that 〈sgn[q]z〉fr = 0 and that either
lim
α→0
γ(1−φ) = 0 or γ = 1−
√
1−φ
α
〈σˆz〉fi (54)
(in leading order for α → 0). Multiplication of both
sides of the second equation in (54) by γ
√
α shows that it
automatically ensures the validity of the second condition
of (50). The first equation of (54) will satisfy the second
condition of (50) as long as γ > 0.
In order to proceed we need to calculate the persistent
term q in the proposed solutions, which can be seen as
representing their ‘effective initial conditions’. It incor-
porates both the true initial conditions and the effects of
the transients of the dynamics, which initially will not
be of the simple form (44). Exact evaluation would re-
quire solving our order parameter equations for arbitrary
times, which is not feasible. However, one can for now
proceed on the basis of the postulate that the properties
of the long-term attractors (viz. the Gaussian variable
z) are uncorrelated with the value of q. The conditions
(49,50) then simply state whether a value of q, generated
independently of z according to some distribution P (q),
is compatible with a given attractor. Although we will
not be able to generate all possible stationary solutions of
the process (17), we will show how two qualitatively dif-
ferent solutions, one with a diverging volatility for α→ 0
and one with a vanishing volatility for α → 0, can both
be extracted from our equations.
The first type of solution is obtained for limα→0 φ =
φ0 < 1. Now one finds, in leading order in α, that
σˆ = −sgn[γz] and that γ = 〈|z|〉fi
√
(1 − φ0)/α. The
conditions (49,50) reduce in leading order to the comple-
mentary pair
frozen : |q| > 1
2
γ|z|
√
α(1 − φ0) (55)
oscillating : |q| < 1
2
γ|z|
√
α(1 − φ0) (56)
This, in turn, allows us to calculate φ0 and 〈|z|〉fi:
φ0 =
∫
dq P (q)
∫
dz√
2π
e−
1
2 z
2
θ
[
|q| − 1
2
γ|z|
√
α(1 − φ)
]
=
∫
dq P (q) erf
[ √
2|q|
γ
√
α(1− φ)
]
〈|z|〉fi =
∫
dq P (q)
1−φ0
∫
dz |z|√
2π
e−
1
2 z
2
θ
[
1
2
γ|z|
√
α(1−φ0)−|q|
]
=
√
2
(1−φ0)
√
π
∫
dq P (q) e−2q
2/γ2α(1−φ0)
We eliminate γ in favour of σ = 12
√
2γ
√
1− φ0 and end
up with the following simple closed equation for σ:
σ =
∫
dq P (q)
e−q
2/σ2α
√
απ
(57)
The associated value for φ0 then follows from:
φ0 =
∫
dq P (q) erf
[ |q|
σ
√
α
]
(58)
Finally we can use our observations regarding the first
few time-steps (section VI) of the process in order to ob-
tain an estimate for P (q). These showed for small α that
initially (i) for small |q(0)| = O(√α) the system is driven
towards the oscillating state, (ii) for large |q(0)| = O(α0)
the system tends to freeze, (iii) the transient processes
are dominated by the (Gaussian) noise term in (17), and
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FIG. 5. Experimental evidence in support of the existence
of a critical value for the initial strategy valuation q(0) below
which a high-volatility solution exists. The connected mark-
ers represent the results of measuring the volatility in individ-
ual simulations, performed with N = 4000 agents and initial
conditions where qi(0) = q(0), and after in excess of 1000 it-
eration steps. CPU and memory limitations prevent us from
doing reliable and conclusive experiments for α < 0.0125; the
available data, however, are clearly not in conflict with our
theoretical prediction qc ≈ 0.242 (vertical dashed line), which
follows from equation (59).
(iv) the noise term is automatically being ‘amplified’ (ei-
ther via a diverging response function, or via accumula-
tion over time) to an effective O(α0) contribution. Note
that (i) and (ii) confirm that q can indeed be seen as the
sum of q(0) and the net effect of the transient processes,
and that (iii) and (iv) subsequently suggest represent-
ing the transient processes by adding a single effective
Gaussian variable. Hence for small α it would appear
sensible to write P (q) = (Λ
√
2π)−1e−
1
2 [q−q(0)]
2/Λ2 , which
converts (57,58) into
σ2α + 2Λ2 =
1
π
e
−
2q2(0)
σ2α+2Λ2
We conclude that σ can be written in terms of the solu-
tion y of a transcendental equation
σ =
1√
α
[
2q2(0)
y
− 2Λ2
] 1
2
2q2(0) =
y
π
e−y (59)
For |q(0)| → 0 we find that σ = (απ)− 12√1− 2πΛ2, hence
we must obviously require Λ2 < 1/2π. The associated
value for φ0 then follows from:
φ0 =
∫
Dx erf
[ |q(0) + Λx|
σ
√
α
]
(60)
Since we cannot calculate or estimate the width Λ of
the effective Gaussian noise term without solving our or-
der parameter equations for short times (Λ could even
depend on q(0)), it is quite satisfactory that several in-
teresting properties of the solution are found to be inde-
pendent of Λ. For instance, one always finds a diverging
volatility of the form σ = O(α− 12 ), and there is a critical
value qc = (2πe)
− 12 ≈ 0.242 such that for |q(0)| > qc
the solution no longer exists. This solution is clearly the
type of volatile state which has been reported regularly
(see e.g. [8,9]) upon observing numerical simulations. We
have now found, however, that whether or not it will ap-
pear depends critically on the choice made for the initial
conditions. Numerical simulations indeed appear to sup-
port the existence and predicted magnitude of a critical
value qc ≈ 0.242 (see figure 5); fully conclusive experi-
ments, however (with even smaller values of α), would
require impractical amounts of CPU and/or memory in
order to meet the requirements p → ∞ and N → ∞ for
increasingly small values of α, and are presently ruled
out. In the limit q(0) → 0 one can easily carry out the
integrals in (60), giving Λ = (2π)−
1
2 sin[ 12πφ0]. Elimina-
tion of Λ via insertion into σ = (απ)−
1
2
√
1− 2πΛ2 then
leads to the simple relation
α, q(0)→ 0 : σ = cos[
1
2πφ0]√
απ
+O(α0) (61)
This is the high-volatility solution shown in the α < αc
regime of figure 3, with φ0 as measured in simulations
(see e.g. figure 2). The power of α in (61) is observed to
be correct. The observed difference between theory and
experiment with regard to the prefactor can be under-
stood as a reflection of our approximation c + d ≈ 1;
this amounts to disregarding deviations from the ide-
alized ‘purely frozen’ or ‘purely oscillating’ behaviour,
which can indeed be expected to give an approximate
theory which (even for small α) slightly under-estimates
the volatility.
We note that the condition limα→0 φ < 1 for the
above reasoning to apply can in fact be weakened to
limα→0 α/(1 − φ) = 0. The above solution ceases to
hold, however, at the point where the fraction φ of frozen
agents scales as φ = 1−κα+O(α2), in which case we have
to turn to the first option in (54), rather than the second.
This is consistent with our previous observation that
small values of |q(0)| lead to a relatively small fraction of
frozen agents (and a large volatility), whereas for large
|q(0)| such a solution will break down in favour of states
with a larger fraction of frozen agents. Since we can
now no longer use the second equation in (54) to deter-
mine γ, and hence find the volatility σ = 12
√
2γ
√
1− φ,
we have to return to (53). A fully frozen state, which
for α → 0 will indeed be described by this second type
of solution (since limα→0 φ = 1), must necessarily have
G(t > 0) = g. This is consistent with our ansa¨tze, since
it gives
t > 0 : (1 +G)−1(t) = −g(1− g)t−1
which implies
∑
t≥0(1+G)
−1(t) = 0, provided 0 < g < 2.
We can now calculate γ from (53) and find limα→0 γ =
2/(2− g). Thus we obtain, provided 2− g = O(α0):
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FIG. 6. Experimental evidence for the existence of the
limit κ = limα→0(1 − φ)/α for the low-volatility solution.
The markers are obtained from individual simulation runs
performed with a system of N = 4000 agents and initial
valuations of the form qi(0) = q(0) > qc (to evoke the
low-volatility state), and in excess of 1000 iteration steps.
The solid curve to the right of the critical point is the theo-
retical prediction, obtained from the exact equations (26) and
φ = 1− erf[
√
α/2(1 + c)] describing the α > αc regime. The
dotted curve to the left is its continuation into the α < αc
regime (where it should indeed no longer be correct).
σ =
√
2κ
2−g
√
α+O(α) κ = lim
α→0
1−φ
α
We also note that the scaling property φ = 1 − O(α)
implies that P (0) = limq→0 P (q) = O(
√
α), since all q
values of order q = O(√α) will contribute to the fraction
1 − φ of fickle agents, giving 1 − φ = O(P (0)√α). We
can now calculate limα→0 g upon explicitly inspecting the
effect of a perturbation of a frozen state. In view of
G(t > 0) = g we may restrict ourselves to considering
the effect on sgn[q(t + 1)] of a perturbation at time t,
giving in leading order for α→ 0:
lim
α→0
g = lim
α→0
lim
θ→0
〈 ∂
∂θ
sgn
[
q +
1
2
αγz
√
κ(−1)t + θ
]
〉
= 2 lim
α→0
〈δ
[
q +
1
2
αγz
√
κ(−1)t
]
〉
= 2 lim
α→0
P (0) = 0
Hence, since the frozen state has q = O(α0), we find
limα→0 γ = 1 and
α→ 0 : σ = 1
2
√
2κα+O(α) (62)
Explicit calculation of the prefactor in (62) would require
taking our calculations beyond the leading order in α, in
order to determine to find κ. Equation (62) is the low-
volatility solution shown in the α < αc regime of figure
3, with κ as measured in simulations (see e.g. figure 6).
Again the power of α in (62) is observed to be correct.
The remaining difference between theory and experiment
with regard to the prefactor can again be understood as
a reflection of our approximation c+d ≈ 1, which induces
a structural under-estimation of the volatility.
XI. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have solved a ‘batch’ version of the
minority game with random external information, using
generating functional analysis (or dynamic mean field
theory) a´ la De Dominicis, which allows one to carry
out the disorder averages in a dynamical context. Since
the dynamics of the game is not described by a detailed
balance type stochastic process, equilibrium statistical
mechanical tools can not be applied directly. Phase
transitions (if present) must be of a dynamical nature.
The disorder in the minority game consists of the mi-
croscopic realisation of the repertoire of randomly drawn
trading strategies of the N agents. Upon taking the limit
N → ∞ (where N denotes the number of agents play-
ing the game) one ends up with an exact non-Markovian
stochastic equation describing the dynamics of an effec-
tive single agent (17), whose statistical properties are
identical to those of the original system (averaged over
all realisations of the disorder). The key control param-
eter in this problem is the ratio α = p/N of the number
of possible values of the external information over the
number of agents.
We find a phase transition at αc = 0.33740, signaled
by the onset of anomalous response, in agreement with
the value reported recently in [4]. The method used in
[4] depends on the fact that for their stochastic version
of the minority game a Lyapunov function exists. Our
approach does not have this constraint and can be easily
applied to those variations of the game where a Lyapunov
function is not available, thus opening up a wider range
of models for analysis (see e.g. [3]). Above αc (where
anomalous response is absent) we can solve the station-
ary state of the system exactly, giving exact expressions
for quantities such as the fraction of frozen agents (which
is zero for α → ∞ but increases with decreasing α), the
persistent two-time correlations, and the persistent corre-
lations in the total bid. The volatility (which is itself not
an order parameter of the system) can be calculated to
a very good approximation. Above αc, our method and
that of [6,4] are likely to describe the same behaviour
[20]. Below αc, i.e. in the region of complex dynamics
(inaccessible by the replica approach [14]), our present
method still applies. In this region we demonstrate the
existence of multiple stationary states, and derive expres-
sions for the relevant observables in leading order in α as
α → 0. We show, more specifically, that the occurrence
and practical observability of a diverging volatility for
α → 0 (as reported in e.g. [8,9]) is crucially dependent
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on the overall degree of a priori preference for specific
strategies exhibited by the agents at t = 0, which may
explain the different observations regarding the α → 0
behaviour which have been reported in literature [12].
More specifically, our theory points at the existence of
a critical value for the initial strategy valuations, above
which the system will revert to a state with vanishing
volatility. Our theoretical predictions find quite satisfac-
tory confirmation in numerical simulations.
The fact that we can analyse the stationary state of
Eqn. (17), in spite of it describing a non-Markovian
stochastic process, suggests that the present method
should also be suitable to deal with models where the
external information depends on time, or on the previ-
ous behaviour of the agents, as in the original model [1].
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APPENDIX A: EXPRESSIONS FOR AVERAGE
BID AND VOLATILITY
First we calculate limN→∞ 〈At〉 using expression (3).
We note that we obtain 〈At〉 simply by making the re-
placement ei
∑
ti ψi(t)qi(t) → (τ/αN)∑µ xµt in the right-
hand side of Eqn. (6). The disorder average is carried
out as before, but instead of Eqn. (7) we now obtain
〈At〉 = τ
∫
[DCDCˆ][DKDKˆ][DLDLˆ] eN [Ψ+Φ+Ω]+O(N
0)
× e−Φ/α
∫
DwDwˆDxDxˆ x1t e
i
∑
s
[ŵsws+x̂sxs+wsxs]
× e− 12
∑
ss′ [wsws′+ŵsLss′ ŵs′+2x̂sKss′ ŵs′+x̂sCss′ x̂s′ ]
]
where we have used permutation invariance with respect
to µ (after the disorder average). The integral is domi-
nated by the familiar saddle-point. Since the O(N0) term
in the exponent is identical to that in (7), we can now
simply use the identity Z[0] = 1 to show that
lim
N→∞
〈At〉
= τe−Φ/α
∫
DwDwˆDxDxˆ xt e
i
∑
s
[ŵsws+x̂sxs+wsxs]
× e− 12
∑
ss′ [wsws′+2ix̂sGss′ ŵs′+x̂sCss′ x̂s′ ]
]
= 0 (A1)
The last step follows immediately from the anti-
symmetry of the integrand under overall reflection.
To determine the disorder-averaged volatility ma-
trix, which for N → ∞ becomes identical to 〈AtAt′〉
due to (A1) and the self-averaging property, we
first work out the dominant terms in (5). Using
limN→∞(αN)
−1
∑
µΩ
2
µ =
1
2 , we obtain the relatively
simple expression
lim
N→∞
〈AtAt′〉 = lim
N→∞
1
2αN
∑
µ
〈[xµt +Ωµ/τ ][xµt′ +Ωµ/τ ]〉
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We calculate this average by making the replacement
ei
∑
ti
ψi(t)qi(t) → (2αN)−1∑µ〈[xµt + Ωµ/τ ][xµt′ + Ωµ/τ ]〉
in the right-hand side of Eqn. (6). Repeated integration
by parts over the wµt shows that we may equivalently
put ei
∑
ti
ψi(t)qi(t) → (2αN)−1∑µ ŵµt ŵµt′ . Following the
steps we also took in calculating 〈A〉 now gives
lim
N→∞
〈AtAt′〉
=
1
2
e−Φ/α
∫
DwDwˆDxDxˆ ŵtŵt′e
i
∑
s
[ŵsws+x̂sxs+wsxs]
× e− 12
∑
ss′ [wsws′+2ix̂sGss′ ŵs′+x̂sCss′ x̂s′ ]
]
=
1
2
∫
Dŵ ŵtŵt′ e
− 12
∑
ss′ ŵs[(1+G)
TD−1(1+G)]
ss′ ŵs′∫
Dŵ e−
1
2
∑
ss′ ŵs[(1+G)TD−1(1+G)]ss′ ŵs′
=
1
2
[(1 +G)−1D(1 +GT )−1]tt′ (A2)
APPENDIX B: CONSEQUENCES OF ABSENCE
OF ANOMALOUS RESPONSE
Lemma 1 Consider two bounded sequences of real num-
bers At and bt. Because bt is bounded, there exists
a number b such that limτ→∞
1
τ
∑
t≤τ bt = b. Define
aτ =
∑
t≤τ At, and assume that limτ→∞ aτ = a. Then
lim
τ→∞
1
τ
∑
t≤τ
∑
t′≤t
At−t′b
′
t = ab
Proof Upon substituting of t→ t+ t′ we find
1
τ
∑
t≤τ
∑
t′≤t
At−t′bt′ =
1
τ
∑
t′≤τ
bt′
∑
t≤τ−t′
At =
1
τ
∑
t≤τ
aτ−tbt
The sequences {a} and {b} are bounded, so there exist
numbers Ca and Cb such that |at| < Ca and |bt| < Cb
for all t ≥ 0. The sequence {a} converges to a, so for
any ǫ > 0 there exists an K such that for all t > K:
|at − a| < ǫ/3Cb. We now choose M such that for all
τ > M , | 1τ
∑
t≤τ bt − b| < ǫ/3|a| and KCaCb/τ < ǫ/3.
Then we find for all τ > M :∣∣∣∣∣∣1τ
∑
t≤τ
aτ−tbt − ab
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣1τ
τ∑
t=τ−K
aτ−tbt +
1
τ
∑
t<τ−K
aτ−tbt − ab
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣1τ
τ∑
t=τ−K
aτ−tbt
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣1τ ∑
t<τ−K
(aτ−t − a)bt − a
(
b− 1
τ
∑
t<τ−K
bt
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤ KCaCb
τ
+
∣∣∣∣∣1τ ∑
t<τ−N
(aτ−t − a)bt
∣∣∣∣∣+ |a|
∣∣∣∣∣b− 1τ ∑
t<τ−K
bt
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ǫ
Hence the limit is as claimed.
Lemma 2 Suppose Gst = G(s − t) ∈ ℜ, where G(t) =
0 for all t < 0 and with limτ→∞
∑
t≤τ G(t) = k, and
suppose limτ→∞ τ
−1
∑
t≤τ s(t) = s. Then for all n ∈ N:
lim
τ→∞
1
τ
τ∑
t=1
∑
t′
(Gn)tt′s(t
′) = kns.
Proof The proof proceeds by induction. For n = 0, the
statement is trivially true. Suppose now that it is true
for all n ≤ m. Then
lim
τ→∞
1
τ
τ∑
t=1
∑
t′
(Gm+1)tt′s(t
′) =
lim
τ→∞
1
τ
τ∑
t=1
∑
t′′≤t
G(t− t′′)
∑
t′≤t′′
(Gm)t′′t′s(t
′)
The sequence bt =
∑
t′≤t(G
m)tt′s(t
′) satisfies the condi-
tions of the preceding lemma, application of which gives
lim
τ→∞
1
τ
τ∑
t=1
∑
t′
(Gm+1)tt′s(t
′) = k.kms = km+1s
Hence the claim holds for m + 1, and by induction it is
now proved for all n.
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